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The Challenge of Restoring Debt Sustainability in a Deep Economic Recession:
The case of Greece
Introduction
The large fiscal adjustment undertaken in many advanced economies in recent years has stimulated renewed interest in the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity. To measure these effects, one needs to make an assumption about the size (and the persistence) of fiscal multipliers. 1 A number of recent empirical studies have demonstrated that fiscal multipliers may be significantly higher in economic downturns than in expansions (see for instance, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2011; Baum and Koester, 2011; Batini et al., 2012; and Blanchard and Leigh, 2013) . In a nutshell, while the earlier literature suggests an average first-year (i.e., impact) fiscal multiplier of around 0.6 for advanced economies, there are strong reasons to believe that in the current environment the multiplier may be closer to 1 and, in certain cases, even higher than that.
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While a vast volume of theoretical and empirical work exists on the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity (albeit with broadly inconclusive results), the feedback effect from growth to fiscal aggregates, and in particular to government debt, has received less attention. This issue is becoming increasingly important at this juncture as debt reduction has become a key policy target in a number of 2 advanced economies. In the EU, new provisions in the Stability and Growth Pact require member states with a public debt to GDP ratio higher than 60% to act to put it on a downward path so as any excess of the ratio over the said threshold decreases by 1/20 th on a 3-year rolling basis.
In the case of Greece, an aggressive fiscal consolidation effort has been undertaken since the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis and the subsequent signing of two consecutive economic stabilization programs.
This effort has led to a cumulative adjustment of 19.4ppts of GDP in the cyclically adjusted primary fiscal balance, to a surplus of 5.8%-of-GDP in 2013, from a deficit of 13. 6%-of-GDP in 2009 (IMF, 2014 . Despite this unprecedented improvement (and a number of steps taken in 2012 to restructure privately-held Greek public debt), the country's general government debt ratio has actually increased by 45.3ppts since 2009, reaching 175%-of-GDP at the end of 2013. This development naturally raises the question of whether Greece's fiscal adjustment is actually a "self-defeating" proposition, in the sense that the implementation of aggressive fiscal consolidation in a depressed economy may erode the fiscal balance and worsen debt dynamics on a sustained basis.
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The specter of self-defeating consolidations was initially raised in Gros (2011) , where a simple framework was utilized to show that austerity could indeed increase the debt ratio in the short-run. However, Gros does not examine the impact of repeated episodes of tightening; neither does he explore the implications of multiplier persistence, two key 3 factors that have been subsequently examined in several empirical and are arguably relevant to the Greek case studies (see e.g. European Commission, 2012, and Eyraud and Weber, 2013) .
This study presents a simulation exercise for Greece to highlight the effects of the applied fiscal austerity program on the debt ratio and other important fiscal metrics. The paper employs the stock-flow accounting identity, known as intertemporal budget constraint, to study the evolution of the Greek public debt ratio under different assumptions regarding: a) the size and the degree of persistence of fiscal multiplies; b) the size and the implementation profile of the applied fiscal adjustment; and c) the response of financial markets to fiscal consolidation (myopic vs. forward-looking markets).
The main results of our study are as follows: (i) other things being equal, the chances of a "self-defeating" consolidation increase with the initial debt level, the size of the fiscal multiplier and its persistence; (ii) in view of Greece's present elevated debt ratio, a fiscal adjustment can lead to an initial (contemporaneous) rise in the debt ratio if the fiscal multiplier is higher than ca 0.5; (iii) the chance of self-defeating consolidation also increases if financial markets act myopically, by placing a disproportionate weight on the initial rise in the debt ratio following a fiscal policy tightening; (iv) to a large extent, Greece has been sealed from the latter effect, as more than 80% of its public debt is currently held by the official sector at concessional interest rates that are likely to decrease further following the provision of a new debt relief package by official lenders (expected by to the end of 2014); (v) despite the unprecedented improvement in Greece's underlying fiscal position since 4 2010, the concomitant increase in the country's public debt ratio can be mainly attributed to the ratio's elevated initial level, a very wide initial structural deficit as well as the deep economic recession. The aforementioned factors have led to an increase in the debt ratio that is likely to prove temporary; and (vi) notwithstanding its negative initial effects on domestic economic activity, the enormous fiscal effort undertaken in the last 4-5 years leaves the country's debt ratio in a more sustainable path relative to a range of alternative scenarios assuming no adjustment or a more gradual implementation profile of fiscal consolidation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review on fiscal multipliers. Section 3 presents some unpleasant arithmetic of fiscal consolidations. Section 4 presents the main results of our simulation exercise and analyzes their policy implications. Section 5 concludes.
A brief literature review on fiscal multipliers
Determinants of fiscal multipliers
Prior theoretical and empirical work on the response of main macroeconomic aggregates to exogenous fiscal shocks has shown that the size and, in certain instances, the sign of the fiscal multiplier can be country-, estimation method-, and economic conditions-specific. In general, it appears that quite diverse views continue to exist among professional economists and policy makers as regards the quantitative and qualitative effects of fiscal policy (see e.g. Perotti, 2004 Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and extended by Perotti (2004) .
A recent literature review by Mineshima et al, (2013) 
where t is the time subscript (years); b t is the public debt to GDP ratio in year t; pbal is the primary budget balance to GDP ratio; g represents nominal GDP growth; and r is the average nominal effective interest rate on debt. In our study, the latter variable is proxied by the ratio of total interest expenditure in year t over the public debt stock of year t-1.
By definition, the general government balance is the sum of a cyclical component and a structural component:
where cab is the cyclically adjusted general government balance and cb is the cyclical component of the balance. The fiscal multiplier, m t , of year t is defined as the ratio of nominal GDP over a decrease (increase) in the cyclically adjusted primary balance 9 :
where, d is the first-differencing operator, Y represents GDP in levels and CAPB is the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance in levels. 7 The EU fiscal framework uses a standard "two-step methodology", which consists in computing the cyclical component of the budget first and then subtracting it from the actual budget balance. In algebraic terms cab t = bal t − cb t , where bal stands for the nominal budget balance to GDP ratio and cb for its cyclical component (European Commission, 2013) . The determination of the cyclical component of balances in the EU methodology requires two inputs: i) a measure of the cyclical position of the economy (the output gap, og t ) and ii) a measure of the link between the economic cycle and the budget (cyclical-adjustment budgetary parameter). The product of the two measures gives the cyclical component of the budget, cb t = ε * og t , which is then subtracted from the headline budget-to-GDP ratio to obtain the cab. 8 See e.g. European Commission (2012, 2013) 9 As we have noted already, fiscal multiplier is defined as the ratio of a change in output to an exogenous change in the fiscal deficit with respect to their corresponding baselines. In the formula presented in the text we divide by the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance CAPB in order to disentangle the effects of automatic stabilizers i.e., the feedback effect from the change in output on the fiscal balance. Moreover, we implicitly assume that the change in CAPB is orthogonal to the state of the macroeconomy, an assumption crucial for the identification of exogenous fiscal shocks. Such an assumption is central to the identification approach followed in the standard fiscal SVAR framework introduced by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and extended by Perotti (2004) , albeit at quarterly time frequencies.
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From equations (1)-(3) and after some arithmetic manipulations, 10 it can be shown that a fiscal consolidation in year t leads to a contemporaneous increase in the debt ratio (i.e., ≥ 0) if the following condition is met:
which, for a small g can be approximated by the following formula:
For the case of Greece, taking as a reference ratio the country's 
Multiplier persistence
As we have explained in the previous section, fiscal consolidations may have negative short-run repercussions not only for economic activity but also for aggregate fiscal metrics, especially in the presence of a high initial debt ratio and fiscal multipliers significantly higher than these documented in early studies. To get a clearer understanding of the effects of fiscal austerity on the debt ratio, let us consider the following 10 See e.g. Boussard et al. (2012 
In equation (5) above, the first term (-1) in the right-hand side represents the (positive) direct effect of fiscal consolidation that improves one-to-one the primary fiscal budget and thus, it has a reducing effect on the debt ratio. However, this positive impact is partially offset (and, in certain instances, more than outweighed) by the effects of declining output on government revenues through the interplay of automatic stabilizers; this (numerator) effect is represented by the last term on the right-hand side of the above equation i.e., multiplier*revenue_ratio. In addition to that, the decline in economic activity following fiscal tightening reduces the denominator of debt-to-GDP, exerting an increasing effect on the said ratio; the latter effect is represented by the second term in the right-hand side of equation (5) and it is known as the denominator effect.
For a country featuring a debt ratio of, say, 100%, a revenue ratio of 40%
and a fiscal multiplier of 0.6, a discretionary fiscal tightening of 1ppt-of-GDP lowers the debt ratio (relative to the no-policy-change baseline) by only 0.16% of GDP in the first year. That is, assuming all others factors remaining unchanged. In the case of Greece, given the country's current debt ratio (ca. 175%-of-GDP at the end of 2013) and the present general government revenue ratio (ca. 44%-of-GDP), a fiscal multiplier of, say, 1
11 See Eyraud and Weber (2013) .
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means that a fiscal tightening of 1ppt-of-GDP would actually increase the debt ratio by 0.45 ppts-of-GDP (relative to the baseline of no consolidation) in the year that the fiscal consolidation is implemented. In more general terms, the aforementioned analysis suggests that, ceteris paribus, the chances of a self-defeating consolidation increase, with the initial debt level, the size of the multiplier and its persistence.
Note that the analysis above describes the contemporaneous (i.e., same year) dynamics of the debt ratio following a 1ppt of GDP fiscal years? In the following sections, we will attempt to shed some light on these and other related issues.
Market reaction to fiscal consolidation
From the intertemporal budget constraint in equation (1) that describes debt dynamics, it is apparent that the debt ratio increases with the 16 nominal effective interest rate on debt. Thus, assuming that the initial (year t-1) debt ratio is 100% of GDP, the average nominal effective interest rate on debt is 4.50%, nominal GDP growth in year t is 0.0% and the primary fiscal balance is 0.0% of GDP, then in the absence of stockflow adjustments, the rise in the debt ratio in year t will be 4.5ppts of GDP. This simple arithmetic example demonstrates the importance of market reaction to a fiscal consolidation, especially in cases where fiscal adjustment leads to an initial rise in the debt ratio. To address this issue, the recent literature distinguishes between myopic markets and more normal i.e., forward looking markets, depending on the sovereign bond yield sensitivity to the thrust of the fiscal consolidation effort and the subsequent change in the debt ratio.
In order to take account of these influences, Boussard et al. (2012) parameterize the change in the average effective interest rate on debt as follows:
where d(r t )/d(capb t ) depicts the change in the average effective interest rate on debt per one unit change in the cyclically-adjusted primary fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio, μ is the yield sensitivity to fiscal consolidation and γ is the yield sensitivity to the debt ratio in year t+h (for h ≥ 1). Here, parameter h, the horizon of financial markets, plays a key role. In particular, h =1 and γ>0 indicate that markets exhibit a high degree of myopia by concentrating on the initial rise in the debt ratio following consolidation and thus demanding a higher risk premium for holding the country's sovereign debt. On the other hand, for cases where μ <0, γ>0 17 and h is much higher than 1, markets behave in a more normal (i.e., forward-looking) manner, by concentrating on the longer-term fiscal consolidation impact on the debt ratio and thus demanding a lower risk premium. Overall, the analysis presented above suggests that the chances of self-defeating consolidation increase if financial markets act myopically, by placing a disproportionate weight on the initial rise in the debt ratio following a fiscal policy tightening.
In the case of Greece, it is important to note that, to a large extent, the country has been sealed from the aforementioned effects, as more than 80% of its public debt is currently held by the official sector at concessional interest rates that are expected to decrease further following a new debt relief package (expected before the end of 2014).
Hysteresis
Delong and Summers (2012) suggest that in a depressed economy even a small amount of "hysteresis" -i.e., a small impact on potential output due to the economic downturn -means, by simple arithmetic, that expansionary fiscal policy is likely to be self-financing. Although the authors clarify that their argument "does not justify unsustainable fiscal policies, nor does it justify delaying the passage of legislation to make unsustainable fiscal policies sustainable" it is clear that the notion of hysteresis takes particular importance for fiscal consolidations undertaken during deep economic downturns, where multipliers are likely to be both high and persistent i.e., their recessionary effects stretch well beyond the year that fiscal adjustment is applied. In the following section we present the results of a simulation exercise for Greece, which takes into account the potential effects of some on the aforementioned factors on the evolution of the country's public debt ratio.
The case of Greece: a simulation exercise
This section presents a simulation exercise, which aims to measure the effects on public debt of the fiscal austerity measures that have been of GDP; the cyclically adjusted primary fiscal deficit equals 13.6% of (potential) GDP; the nominal effective interest rate on debt equals 4.5%;
nominal GDP growth equals -0.9%; and the debt to GDP ratio equals 129.8% (b0 = 129.8%).
Our exercise also examines two initial values for the first-year (impact) multiplier; namely -1.5 "high multiplier" and -0.5 "low multiplier", while persistence is incorporated in our simulation framework by assuming that the multiplier follows the convex, autoregressive decaying path analyzed in Appendix 2. In our simulation, "high persistence" increased social unrest and/or an inability/unwillingness of the domestic political system to implement an aggressive consolidation program so as to swiftly correct sizeable long-standing fiscal imbalances.
Scenario 5 -"Full frontloaded adjustment -high-multiplier / low
persistence" is the same as Scenario 1, assuming instead a high impact multiplier value and low persistence.
Scenario 6 -"Full frontloaded adjustment -low multiplier / low
persistence" is the same as Scenario 1, assuming instead a low impact multiplier value and low persistence. Scenario 5 -"Full_ frontloaded adjustment_ high-multiplier / low persistence"  Same as Scenario 1, with "low" multiplier persistence parameter values.
Scenario 6 -"Full_ frontloaded adjustment_ low multiplier / low persistence"  Same as Scenario 1, with "low" impact multiplier value and "low" multiplier persistence parameters.
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The graphical depiction of the aforementioned scenarios in Figure 1 suggests that despite an initial (temporary) rise in the debt ratio under full frontloaded adjustment (above the levels envisaged in all other scenarios), the former is clearly superior from a fiscal sustainability perspective, as all other scenarios lead to either explosive debt dynamics or a stabilization of the debt ratio at much higher levels relative to the baseline.
A similar conclusion is drawn from the inspection of Figure 2 , with the main difference now being that the latter incorporates different assumptions as regards GDP growth (realized and projected). These assumptions effectively benefit (to a significant degree) all alternative no-full-adjustment scenarios, as they allow them to take advantage of the effects of e.g. the PSI+ and the debt buyback operation conducted in 2012. They also allow them to benefit from the concessional rates on official loans provided to Greece after the country fulfilled major prior actions and milestones in the context of its adjustment programs. Another alternative scenario (not shown in Figure   2 ) incorporating realized and projected market rates and bond yield spreads, leads to an even steeper explosive path for the debt ratio than these depicted by the no consolidation scenarios in Figure 2 . 
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Concluding remarks
This study presents a simulation exercise for Greece to highlight the effects of the applied fiscal austerity program on the debt ratio and other important fiscal metrics. The paper employs the stock-flow accounting identity, known as the intertemporal budget constraint, to study the evolution of the Greek public debt ratio under different assumptions regarding the size and the degree of persistence of fiscal multiplies, the size and the implementation profile of the applied fiscal adjustment as well as the response of financial markets to fiscal consolidation.
The main results of the study are summarized below: a) in view of Greece's present elevated debt ratio, a fiscal adjustment can lead to an initial (contemporaneous) rise in the debt ratio if the fiscal multiplier is higher than around 0.5; b) despite the unprecedented improvement in Greece's underlying fiscal position since 2010, the concomitant increase in the country's public debt ratio can be mainly attributed to the ratio's elevated initial level, a very wide initial structural deficit as well as the ensuing economic recession; and c) notwithstanding its negative initial effects on domestic economic activity, the enormous fiscal effort undertaken in the last 4-5 years leaves the country's debt ratio in a more sustainable path relative to a range of alternative scenarios assuming no adjustment or a more 28 gradual implementation profile of fiscal consolidation relative to that implemented thus far.
Although an assessment of the optimal mix of fiscal austerity measures for Greece is beyond the scope of this paper, our analysis suggests that the front-loading nature of the applied adjustment program has been instrumental in stabilizing debt dynamics, especially as the attainment of a primary surplus in the general government accounts in FY-2013 opens the door for the provision of a new debt relief package by official lenders. As discussed in the paper, the said package is expected to involve further interest rate reductions and loan maturity extensions so as to facilitate fulfilment of the official targets for the public debt to GDP ratio (i.e., ca 124% in 2020 and110% or lower in 2022) and a further reduction of medium-term borrowing needs.
In addition, forward-looking markets have applauded the unprecedented fiscal adjustment Greece has undertaken since the inception of its stabilization program (cumulative improvement in the structural primary balance in excess of 19ppts-of-GDP), compressing the 10-year Greek Government Bond/German Bund yield spread to ca 420bps in mid-June 2014, from a record of around 3,550bps reached in early 2012. This has allowed the country to re-access financial markets with as many as two sovereign debt issues earlier this year (€3bn of 5-year bonds and €1.5bn of 3-year bonds), as perceived "GREXIT" risks have retreated precipitously since late 2012.
The sharp compression of sovereign risk premia has also allowed a number of Greek corporations to raise market funding from abroad at a reasonable prices, relaxing the borrowing constraints they have been 29 facing in the domestic market and setting the ground for a resumption of domestic investment activity.
True, one can convincingly argue that the implementation of aggressive fiscal austerity has exacerbated the domestic recession (cumulative output losses in excess of 25ppts over the last six years), not least because recent empirical evidence suggests that fiscal multipliers tend increase in periods of deep economic contractions. However, in the absence of an ambitious (and front-loaded) fiscal adjustment program it would be rather impossible to stabilize investor sentiment towards Greece and correct severe macroeconomic imbalances accumulated in the period leading to the global financial crisis.
Looking ahead, one of the biggest challenges facing the country is to maintain fiscal discipline and complete the program of structural reforms in public administration and the domestic product and services markers agreed with its official lenders, so as to facilitate a return to sustainable and more balanced economic growth.
